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WASHINGTON

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VIII

APRIL, 1934

NUMBER 4

THE NEW WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT*
SECTION 20 sets forth the liability of incorporators, subscribers,
shareholders, directors, and officers. Subdivision -1 limits the
liability of a subscriber or holder of shares to his obligation to
comply with the terms of Ins subscription with the qualification that
a shareholder who acquires his shares in good faith and without
knowing that the shares had not been fully paid for shall not be
liable to the corporation. In general, this subdivision complies
with the existing law.43 While the latter part of this subdivision
provides that one who becomes a shareholder in good faith without knowledge that the shares have been fully paid for shall not
be liable to the corporation, it is submitted that unless he has in
addition paid value for such shares that the lien of the corporation
provided for in Section 22 hereafter will prevail over the donee's
rights. Further, as SECTION 16 provides that a certificate shall not
be issued until the shares have been fully paid for it will be onlyin the exceptional case that there can be a shareholder in good
faith and without knowledge.

Subdivision 2 exempts a shareholder from personal liability
except to the extent of the amount unpaid upon any subscription
made by him. This states the customary rule for limited liability
granted by statutes to shareholders through corporate organization upon the theory that the contributions of the stockholders are
a substitute for personal liability 4 4 As the subdivision provides
that every shareholder is to the extent of ins unpaid subscription
individually and personally liable for the debts and liability of the
corporation, there is suggested a direct liability to the creditors of
the corporation. However, it was held in the case of the City of
Montesano v. F L. Carr4 5 under a sunilar statute that an action
,* Constitution of the State of Washington, Art. 12, sec. 4, Eureka Mining Company v. Lwvely, 59 Wash. 550, 110 Pac. 425 (1910) Dames v. Ball,
64 Wash. 292, 116 Pac. 833 (1911).
"4Gordon v. Cuimmngs, 78 Wash. 515, 139 Pac. 489 (1914)
Ballantine,
Corporations (1st ed.) 1927, sec. 213.
4 City of Montesano v. Carr 80 Wash. 384, 141 Pac. 894 (1914).
* Continued from last issue.
"The Reserved Power of Legislature to Change," which appeared in
the title of the preceding issue was fully covered and is omitted from this
and the following article.
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Subdivision 3, providing that one holding shares in a fiduciary
capacity shall not be personally liable merely for so holding such
shares, is declaratory of existing law
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Subdivision 4 provides that nothing in this Act shall be construed in derogation of any rights which any person may have
under the common law or equity because of any fraud practiced
upon him by an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder, director,
officer or the corporation, also that the Act shall not be construed
in derogation of any rights the corporation may have through any
fraud practised by any such persons. Of the various usual possible
factual situations giving rise to such rights, that of the consequences of overvaluation or watered stock stands out. Various
theories have been suggested both as to the validity of watered
stock as against the corporation and as to the liability of the stockholders to the creditors on account of such stock. The usual theories
advanced for explanation are those of "trust fund" or "fraud or
holding out." Neither is satisfactory for each is fictitious being
48
evolved for the sole purpose of rationalizing the decisions.
Jurisdictions disagree as to what constitutes overvaluation of
consideration and amounts to fraud, some making it depend upon
"See annotation to last cited case in 7 A. L. R. 100; Ballantine, Cor-

porations (1st ed.) 1927, sec. 219. See an excellent article by Bonbright,
"Shareholders' Defenses Against Liability to Creditors on Watered Stock,"
25 Col. L. Rev. 408 (1925) On page 416 he states with respect to the general principles of stockholders' liability to creditors the following:
"1. At common law the general rule is that stockholders are not
personally liable for the unpaid balance on shares issued below
par under an agreement between the corporation and the stockholder that they shall be considered full paid, but to this rule
most courts recognize one exception, namely, a 'fraud' liability to
such creditors as may be presumed to have relied on the fictitious
capitalization.
"2. The presence of constitutional or statutory provisions forbidding the issuance of stock for any consideration less than par,
results in little if any modification of the commmon law principles.
"3. In those states in which the statutes specifically declare
that stockholders are liable to creditors for unpaid balances due
on their shares, some courts hold, in effect, that -the statute is
simply declaratory of common law and that the rights of creditors
are still to be determined on 'fraud' grounds. But other courts
hold that the right to complain extends now to all creditors and
not merely to creditors who presumably have relied on the false
representation."
"Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3826.
"See Ballantine, Corporations (1st ed.) 1927, sees. 210 et seq., suggesting the different theories advanced for liability. In sec. 213, Mr. Ballantine sets forth what he terms the "statutory obligation theory" which
seems the most plausible and is to the effect that the liability to contribute is the price paid for the privilege of limited liability granted by statute
to those transacting business through the corporate form of organization.
See also Ballantine, "Stockholders' Liability in Minnesota," 7 Minn. L. Rev.
79 (1923) and an article by Mr. Bonbright cited in note 46, supra.
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the good faith of the directors and others upon the true value of
the consideration. The cases in the state of Washington are mconsistent, although the later cases adopt the good faith rule. As
oN 17 provides that the valuation of the incorporators, shareSE
holders, or directors, as the case may be, shall be conclusive, and
this subdivision permits the setting aside of such valuation only
when dishonest, it would seem the good faith rule is finally fixed
m this state. 49
SECTION 21 provides that the transfer of certificates of stock and
the transfers of shares thereby may be regulated by the by-laws
so far as is consistent with the laws of this state.50
SEcTION 22 gives the corporation a lien upon such shares as there
shall be an indebtedness for unpaid subscriptions. It* should be
noted that the lien is restricted to the indebtedness for the shares
and does not cover any general indebtedness of the subscriber to
the corporation. Definite procedure is provided for the enforcement of the lien by a sale of these shares. This procedure should
be contrasted with and differentiated from the prior statute5' which
provided for the sale of stock on the failure of the stockholder to
pay assessments. Passing on this last mentioned statute, the Supreme Court held5 2 that the statute did not give the corporation
a lien, and further that there could not even be a sale unless provided for by the by-laws as required by the statute. Accordingly,
SE T oN 22 of the present Act changes the law by providing for
a lien. Moreover, there is a change in practically every detail of
the procedure in making a sale.
The further question is presented. Shall a sale be permitted in
the case of par stock which will not realize a par value considera" The writer wishes to acknowledge an opinion of Mr. Joseph C. Cheney
with an inclusion of the following citations to the decisions in the State
of Washington: Turner v. Bailey, 12 Wash. 634, 42 Pac. 115 (1895) Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal and Iron Co., 16 Wash. 499, 48 Pac. 333,
737 (1897)
Adamant Manufacturing Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48
Pac. 415 (1897) Kroenert v. Johnson, 19 Wash. 96, 52 Pac. 605 (1898)
Inland Nursery and Floral Co. v. Wright, 57 Wash. 67, 106 Pac. 499 (1910)
Lantz v. Moeller, 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac. 687 (1913) Northern Bank and
Trust Co. v. Day, 83 Wash. 296, 145 Pac. 182 (1915)-- Ragleston v. Pantages,
93 Wash. 221, 160 Pac. 425 (1916) Murphy v. Penton, 96 Wash. 637, 165
Colville Valley Coal Co. v. Rogers, 123 Wash. 360, 212
Pac. 1074 (1917)
Connor v. Robinson, 137 Wash. 672, 243 Pao. 849 (1926),
Pac. 732 (1923)
Crowl v. Asia, 143 Wash. 694, 253 Pac. 597 (1927) and Johnsen v. Pheasant Pickling Co., 74 Wash. Dec. 229, 24 Pac. (2d) 628 (1933).

The reader is also referred to notes in sec. 23 to 28, inclusive,

in the Report of Committees in the Fifth Draft of the General
Corporation Act and Foreign Corporation Act of the Ohio Corporation Law, Dec. 28, 1926.
r See former statute to substantially the same effect, Wash. Rem. Rev.
Stats.,
1933, sec. 3819.
51
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3820.
See Dearborn v. Washington Savings Bank, 18 Wash. 8, 50 Pac. 575
(1897).
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tion? The Act provides in SECTION 15, subdivision 3, that "par
value shares shall be made payable with cash in amount not less
than the aggregate of the value of the shares of par value subscribed for," and in SECTION 16, subdivision 1, that "a certificate
of stock shall not be issued until the shares represented thereby
have been fully paid for." However, provision is made in SECTION
39 for changes of par value into no par value shares and the sale
might thus be effected. Influenced by these provisions and the
possibility that permitting such sales might be used as a device for
making sales at less than par value, it is likely that courts will
require the sale of par value shares to realize a par value consideration. It has been held that a corporation may purchase its
own stock at a sale for unpaid assessments for stock subscriptions. -1 Finally, referring to SECTION 20, subdivision 1, it would
seem that the lien could be cut off only in the event of the issue
of the certificate and a transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value,
in which case the corporation should be estopped or bound by the
apparent authority of its agents in issuing the certificate. 54
SECTION 23 provides that upon the allotment of shares having
no par value that part of the consideration received for such shares
may be treated as "paid-in surplus" rather than as payment
upon the shares. Those fixing the value of the consideration for
non par shares shall specify the proportion set aside as "paid-in
surplus" which shall be shown on the books of the corporation as
a separate item. That part, of course, which is paid for the shares
will become capital stock. "Paid-in surplus" originally consisted
of the surplus realized by the sale of par value stock at a price
above par. It may also arise from payment by incoming shareholders to equalize an earned surplus previously built up, or it
may arise on reorganization where the surplus of the old business
is carried forward - 5 in the new business as a surplus, or it may
arise through original contribution. 6
Often it is desirable at the outset for a corporation to maintain
a portion of its assets free from the restrictions which surround
capital stock. This would be true where the corporation wishes
funds for payment of dividends on its preferred stock during its
53

Mitchell v. Blue Star Mintng Co., 68 Wash. 191, 167 Pac. 130 (1917).
61See generally as to the lien of a corporation on shares, Ballantine,
Corporations (1st ed.) 1927, sec. 154.
51This required some juggling of transfers prior to the adoption of
the present section as the transfer of the entire assets of the old corporation in consideration of and payment for par value and non-par value
stock would freeze the entire assets into capital stock and leave no surplus.
6Johns v. Clother 78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755 (1914). There may be
some difficulty m treating such a contribution as having the usual incidents of surplus. It was suggested in this case that it might be considered
a trust fund for the creditors.
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initial period of operation of business when no money is made.
There being no fixed value to non par stock, this: class of stock offers
a simple solution for obtaining the "paid-rn surplus" as provided
for in this section. There is the possible danger that shareholders
and the public may be misled by the payment of dividends out of
such a surplus, as they may believe it to be paid out of profits
rather than from money contributed by the shareholders. In the
Ohio Corporation Act this is safeguarded by a provision that
"Whenever a dividend is paid m whole, or in part, out of other
than the earned excess of assets, the shareholders receiving such
dividends shall be notified as to its source."157 It may finally be
observed that SEcrox 23 is patterned upon a similar provision
found in the Ohio Corporation Act which was founded upon a
suggestion contained in an article by Mr. A. A. Berle.""
SEcTioN 24 sets forth the method for estimating the fund for
the payment of dividends. It requires that the amount of its
capital stock as defined by the Act 19 shall be carried upon its books
as a liability Surplus arising from an unrealized appreciation or
revaluation of fixed assets must be carried upon the books as a
separate item apart from surplus profits as "paid-rn surplus."
Next in computing the aggregate assets of the corporation proper
allowance must be made for depreciation, depletion and losses, and
deferred assets or prepaid expenses must be written off at least
annually in proportion to their use. With .the foregoing considerations in mind the corporation can pay no dividends rn cash or
property except from the surplus of the aggregate assets over the
aggregate liabilities, including rn the latter its capital stock and
deducting from the aggregate assets such amount as they may have
been increased by unrealized appreciation or revaluation of fixed
assets.
The payment of share dividends is similarly restricted except the aggregate assets may include unrealized appreciation or
revaluation of fixed assets. The reason for the distinction obviously
is because of the difficulty of estimating accurately an unrealized
appreciation. The provisions already mentioned, as well as those
following, show that the policy of the Act is to maintain the integrity of the capital stock of the corporation. A false appreciation
of the fixed assets cannot affect the fund available for the creditors
in the case of a share or stock dividend, as no property will be
withdrawn from the capital stock of the corporation.
Cash dividends cannot be paid out of surplus arising from profits
uOhio General Corporation Act sec. 38 (d).
Ohio Laws of 1931, sec. 8623-38 (d) (e).
" Ohio General Corporation act, sec. 23.
Sec. 1, subdiv. 10, supra.

Modified slightly.

See
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on treasury shares before resale, or unrealized profits due to increase in valuation of inventories before sale, or from the unaccrued or unrealized profits on notes, bonds, or obligations for the
payment of money acquired at a discount unless they are readily
marketable, or from the unacerued or unearned portion of any
unrealized profit.
An additional subdivision provides the further restriction that
dividends payable in shares of any class may not be paid to shareholders of any other class unless the articles so provide or it is
authorized by the vote of the holders of the shares of the class
from which the payment is to be made. Finally subdivision 7
provides for payment of dividends from wasting assets, in which
case the corporation may pay dividends from the net profits without deduction for depletion. This is subject, however, to the rights
60
of shareholders of different classes.
The section in the main is modelled on SECTION 38 of the Ohio
General Corporation Act. As stated above, the policy of the section is to maintain the integrity of its capital stock. This is in
accord with existing law 61 It may be noted, however, that this
policy has been questioned and some of the late corporation codes
in other jurisdictions permit the payment of dividends where there
are current earnings, although the stated capital or capital stock
has become impaired.62 As SECTION 40 of our present Act, as well
as our former statute,63 provides for the reduction of capital stock,
substantially the same result could be obtained by a reduction
under these statutes. It is stated that the committee in the consideration of the Minnesota Act felt that the corporation's management should be permitted gradually to restore the stated capital
when impaired out of the earnings over a period of years, rather
than be required to choose immediately between the declaration of
no dividends and the reduction of stated capital.64 It should be
noted, however, that the reduction of capital stock is secured
usually only through a two-thirds vote of the shareholders and is
a matter of fundamental concern calling for and requiring careful
consideration and is hardly to be considered comparable with the
action of the board of directors in the declaration of a dividend.
Whether or not the directors shall be permitted to declare divi10See Wittenberg v. Federal Mining and Simelting Company, 133 A. 48
(Del. 1926), 12 Corn. L. Quar, 79, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 350.
61Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, see. 3823. See also Northern Bank and
Trust Co. v. Day, 83 Wash. 296, 145 Pac. 182 (1915) Joyce v. Congdon,
114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 (1921).
62Cal. Civ. Code (1931) see. 346, Del. Laws of 1931, sec. 34, Minn. Law
of 1933, Chap. 300, sec. 21 II (c).
"Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3830.
64Hoshour,
"Minnesota Business Corporation Act," 17 Minn. L. Rev.
700 (1933).
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dends from current earnings presents the usual problem, namely
that of deciding between flexible operation and the dangers of
abuse.
It is to be noted further that our Act places no restriction and
makes no differentiation except as a matter of bookkeeping between "paid-rn surplus" and surplus arising from profits. As
already suggested, 5 there is danger when paying dividends from
such a surplus that those receiving the dividends will believe they
are paid from profits and will accordingly be misled as to the
financial condition of the corporation. Another danger lies in the
possible abuse of the use of the "paid-in surplus" for payment
of dividends on shares not contemplated. The Minnesota Act makes
the following limitation. "If there are outstanding shares entitled to preferential dividends, then dividends may be declared
out of 'paid-in surplus' only on such shares.' '6 It may be suggested that some more general limitation is desirable.
SEcTIo
25 sets forth the liability of both directors and shareholders for dividends unlawfully paid or for corporate assets unlawfully returned in any other way Guilty or negligent directors
are made liable jointly and severally to the corporation to the extent of the dividend paid or the sum otherwise unlawfully returned. In the event no director is liable, and to the extent that
the directors though liable are not able to respond in damages to
the corporation, the shareholder is individually liable to the corporation for the amount received by him. Actions must be brought
within two years of the wrongful payment or return, except when
the directors are liable it must be brought within two years from
the date of the judgment against the directors.
This section, as contrasted with the former statute, 7 provides
specifically for a liability on the part of the shareholders as well
as the directors. Further, the shareholders' liability is conditioned
upon the inability of the corporation to recover from the directors.
The former statute contained no such provision and the case law
See see. 23, supra.
"Minn. Laws of 1933, Chap. 300, see. 21, II (b).
6T7ash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3823. "It shall not be lawful for
the trustees to make any dividend except from the net profits arising
from the business of the corporation, nor divide, withdraw or in any way
pay to the stockholders, or any of them, any part of the capital stock of the
company nor to reduce the capital stock of the company unless in the
manner prescribed in this chapter, or in the articles of incorporation or
the by-laws; and in case of any violation of the provisions of this section,
the trustees, under whose administration the same may have happened,
except those who have caused their dissent therefrom to be entered
at large on .the minutes of the board of trustees at the time, or were not
present when the same did happen, shall, in their individual or private
capacities, be jointly or severally liable to the corporation and the creditors thereof in the event of its dissolution, ,to the full amount so divided,

or reduced, or paid out."

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
fixed no order of liability nor was there special provision m the
former law limiting such actions.
Commenting on this section, it may be noted that no specific
test of care is provided for the liability of the directors except
that they shall have acted knowingly, or without making reasonable inquiry The former statute, at least in its wording, states
an absolute test. The Ohio statute, while making the test one of
negligence, specifically exempts the director who relies in good
faith upon the books or a balance sheet duly certified.68
Shareholders are liable under this section irrespective of the
fact that they did not know the payments were unlawful. This is
in accord with the common law 6 It should be noted further that
the liability is to the corporation. While the corporation can recover the full amount on the apparent intent that the capital shall
be kept intact, the creditors' right seems clearly to be derivative
only Therefore, for a creditor to pursue his remedy it will be
permitted only under such circumstances as he can reach the
shareholders' liability as an asset of the corporation. This suggests
the further question in the state of Washington as to the amount
that may be recovered from the shareholder. It has been held
that when a receiver brings the action recovery may be had only
for the amount necessitated to satisfy claims on a pro rata basis
and that all delinquent stockholders must be joined in the action. 0
SECTION 26 provides that the shareholders may make by-laws
not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation. This
authority may be expressly vested by the articles of incorporation
in the board of directors subject to the power of the shareholders
to change or repeal, except that the directors may not make or
alter by-laws fixing their qualifications, classifications, terms of
office, or compensation. Our former statute7' provided that the
corporation "shall have power to make by-laws not inconsistent
with the laws of the State or the United States." The new section
is declaratory of the existing law except subdivision 3, which pro" Ohio General Corporation Act, sec. 8623-123 (b). "A director shall
not be held to have been negligent within the meaning of this section if
he relied and acted in good faith upon the books of the corporation, or
upon a balance sheet and profit and loss statement of the corporation and
a statement of the assets available for a dividend or distribution represented to him to be correct by the president or the officer of the corporation having charge of or supervision of its accounts, or certified. to be
correct by a public accountant or firm of public accountants of good reputation, nor shall he be held to have been negligent if in good faith he considered assets at their book values, nor if in any case he followed what he
believed in good faith to be sound accounting and business practice.
Ballantine, Corporations (1st ed.) 1927, see. 162.
,OSee Einar Johnsen v. Pheasant Pickling Co., 74 Wash. Dec. 229, 24
Pac. (2d) 628, 8 Wash. L. Rev. 89 (1933). See generally as to liability for
wrongful payment of dividends, 55 A. L. R. 73, 98.
11Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3809.
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hibits the delegation of authority to the directors to make or alter
72
by-laws affecting their office.
SEcTiON 27 provides for holding, calling, and adjourmng shareholders' meetings. Contrasted with the former statute" which
required stockholders' meetings to be held at the principal place
of business of the corporation within the state, this section permits
stockholders' meetings to be held without the state unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws.
It is further provided that the by-laws may specify the time
and place of holding shareholders' meetings with the one exception
that the time and place of holding a meeting for the election of
directors may not be changed within sixty days before the date
fixed for election. If the by-laws provide the time and place for
a meeting no notice need-be given as to such meetings unless expressly required by the by-laws. The by-laws customarily provide
for the time and the place of the annual meeting and subdivision 1
of this section requires at least one meeting of the shareholders in
each calendar year. Outside of provisious m the by-laws and articles, and special provisious in the statute, subdivision 4 specifies
that at least ten days' notice shall be given when calling shareholders' meetings, fulfilled by notice properly mailed and addressed to the shareholder at his last known post office address. The
effect of this section generally is to detail and make procedure more
specific.
SECTioN 28 deals with the right to vote, establishes a fiduciary
relationship for the management class of stock, if any, authorizes
voting by proxy, defining irrevocable proxy and setting forth specifically periods for expiration of proxies when not specified, provides for voting pledged stock, and for voting stock held in a fiduciary capacity, whether individually or jointly, provides for voting
of a stock owned by the corporation in other corporations, and
restricts the corporation from voting its own stock.
Subdivision 1 expresses the common law rule that every shareholder shall have the right to one vote except as otherwise provided
in the articles of incorporation. This implies that there may be
non-voting stock, the provision for which has already been discussed under Section 13, supra. That section authorized stock with
such rights, voting powers, preferences and restrictions as may be
provided for in the articles of incorporation and made a change
72 This subdivision prohibits the delegation of the powers mentioned
even by the articles. Such a delegation was not necessarily inconsistent
with the prior statute.
"Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, see. 3816.
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in what was probably the law before its adoption. 4 The balance of
this subdivision makes specific provision for the closing of the
books of the corporation prior to the date of stockholders' meetings for the transaction of certain business. This is in accord with
quite common practice and fixes a limitation only in case the articles or by-laws do not otherwise provide.
Subdivision 2 places a fiduciary relation upon the class or classes
of shareholders having voting powers when denied to other classes.
There is much diversity of opinion as to the advisability of issuing
large blocks of shares without the privilege of voting. It is argued
on the one hand that placing control in a managing group beyond
the power of removal adds to the efficiency of conducting the corporation's business. On the other hand it is urged that those who
are interested in sharing the profits and losses should share in the
control as a matter of protection and self-defense of their interests. 15 It has been suggested as a compromise that non-voting stocks
be given certain voting rights when earnings have fallen below
certain dividend or interest requirements. This could be accomplished through suitable provisions in the articles. Tis subdivision
is an attempt to protect the non-voting class by the creation of the
6
fiduciary relationship.7
Subdivision 3 provides for cumulative voting by the shareholder
for the election of directors. He may multiply his number of votes
by the number of directors to be elected and vote them for one
or more directors as he sees fit. Prior to the adoption of this section there has been some question as to the right to provide for
cumulative voting in the articles or by-laws without constitutional
or statutory authority
It will be observed that the present section not only authorizes cumulative voting, but does not permit
the articles of incorporation to deprive the shareholders of this
right. The purpose of this subdivision is to make possible minority
representation on the board of directors. It may well be contended
that instead of making cumulative voting obligatory that it would
have been better to have made cumulative voting permissible unless otherwise expressly provided in the articles. This is the law in
many jurisdictions.
11See Forquer v. Inland Finance Co., 142 Wash. 688, 253 Pac. 1086
(1927) and State ex rel. FibreboardProducts Co. v. Hinkle, 147 Wash. 10,
264 Pac. 1010 (1928).
1 See Ripley "From Main Street to Wall Street," 137 Atlantic Monthly
94, Note, 13 Cal. L. Rev. 483 (1925) Seligman, "Broader Legal Aspects
of Customer Stock Ownership," 50 Reports of Am. Bar Assn. 851 (1925).
71 See Berle, "Non-Voting Stock and Bankers' Control," 39 Harv. L. Rev.
673 (1926) Wood, "Status of Management Stockholders," 38 Yale L. Jour.
57 (1928) Berle, "Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust," 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1049 (1931). Our Supreme Court is apparently in accord with the rule.
See Telft v. Schaefer 148 Wash. 602, 269 Pac. 1048 (1928).
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No provision is made for giving notice that the privilege of
cumulative voting will be exercised. Unless such notice is given
it is quite possible that cumulating voting may lead to minority
control.77 On the other hand if notice is required and given to the
shareholders the majority will be enabled to protect itself by cumulating its votes so as to maintain a majority control and at the
same time will not defeat minority representation which is the
purpose of the provision. Statutes to this effect have been passed
m Ohio and Minnesota.78 It would seem that a reasonable provision for such notice either in the articles or the by-laws would be
upheld by the courts. A further difficulty in insuring the policy
contemplated by this subdivision is the provision in a subsequent
section7 9 that any director may be removed by a vote of two-thirds
of the stockholders. Comment will be reserved for discussion under
that section.
Subdivision 4 gives the right to vote by proxy duly authorized in
writing and filed with the secretary The proxy may be revoked
unless coupled with an interest. If not coupled with an interest
a proxy may be given not to exceed three years and in the event
no time is specified expires eleven months after the date of its execution. A revocation to be effective must be given to the secretary
These provisions are for the greater part to make the law more
definite and certain. At common law voting could be done only
in person and not by proxy The law m this State prior to the
adoption of this subdivision provided generally for the right.8 0
Subdivision 5 provides that in the case of pledged stock the
pledgor may vote until the shares have been transferred on the
books of the corporation. This is in accord with the prior statute. 81
It is further provided that one holding shares ina fiduciary capacity may vote the same. This is also in accord with existing law8 2
Finally it is provided that if shares are held jointly by three or
more fiduciaries the will of the majority controls and if the fiduciaries are equally divided a court upon petition may appoint an additional person to act with the fiduciaries to secure a determination.
These latter provisions will simplify procedure, as heretofore in
the event of disagreement the determination of the control placed
an unnecessary burden on the court in those cases where facts
were complicated.

77Such was the case of Schwartz v. State ex rel. Schwartz, 61 Ohio
State 497, 56 N. E. 201 (1900).
71Ohio General Corporation Act, sees. 8623-50. Minn. Laws of 1933,
Chap. 300, sec. 25 III.
71Sec. 31, subsec. 4, snfra.
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3812.
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3822.
"Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3821.
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Subdivision 6 provides that a corporation owning shares in another corporation may vote the same by its president or his proxy
subject to the right of the directors to appoint a proxy This again
establishes a rule to apply where no other method of voting has
been prescribed by the corporation. The language of the section
is taken from the Ohio Corporation Act. It is substantially in
accord with our prior law 11
Subdivision 7 merely enacts the common law to the effect that
a corporation may not vote its own stock nor count it in calculating
the total voting power of all shareholders.
SECTION 29 provides in Subdivision 1 that two or more shareholders by an agreement in writing may transfer their shares in
trust, including all voting or other rights, for a period not exceeding ten years upon the terms and conditions stated in their agreement. The object of a voting trust is to unite voting power and
insure control and continuity in the management and policy of a
corporation. Divorcing the voting power of stock from its real or
beneficial ownership irrevocable for a fixed period is subject among
others to these objections, namely, that the voting power was intended to protect the ownership, that it is a breach of duty of the
mutual understanding that each shareholder was to exercise his
personal judgment, that the majority may be subjected to the
control of the minority, and that the power of the trustees may
be used oppressively or fraudulently The modern cases as well as
legislative enactments seem to favor the voting trust to be exercised within reasonable limitations. The welfare of the corporation necessitating the use of such a legal device is held to outweigh
the objections. It has accordingly been held in the State of Washington that a voting trust is not void as against public policy where
it was made in good faith for the advantage of the corporation
and all the shareholders to protect security for a period of twenty
84
years.
Subdivision 2, providing that the trust agreement be filed in
the registered office and open daily to the inspection of any shareholder, practically does away with the possibility of a certain
group of shareholders taking advantage of another group. Particularly is this true as Subdivision 3 provides that any shareholder
may transfer his shares to the same trustee and come under the
terms of the agreement.
I Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3810; Day v. Hecla Mining Co., 126
Wash. 50, 217 Pac. 1 (1923)
First National Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash.
367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928).
81See Winsor v. Cormnonwealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 Pac. 908
(1911)
Gleason v. Earles, 78 Wash. 491, 139 Pac. 213 (1914)
Clark v.
Foster 98 Wash. 241, 167 Pac. 908 (1917) and Day v. Hecla Mining Co..
126 Wash. 50, 217 Pac. 1 (1923).
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Subdivisions 4 and 5 provide the mechanics for carrying into
effect the trust agreement through-the transfer and surrender of
the old stock certificates and the issue of voting trust certificates
by the trustee. Provision is made for the transfer of voting trust
certificates and Subdivision 6 empowers the trustee with the rights
specified in the agreement.
Subdivision 7 permits the trustees, unless restricted by the
agreement to vote by proxy, that their manner of voting shall be
determined as provided in Section 28, Subdivision 5, that vacancies shall be filled by the remaining trustees, and that no trustee
shall be responsible except for his own individual neglect or malfeasance. These provisions fix otherwise controversial matters.8 5
SEcTioN 30 provides for a quorum for shareholders' meetings.
Subdivision 1 defines and specifies a quorum to be the representation requisite to be present in order to organize for the transaction of business. Subdivision 2 fixes this at a majority of the voting power, unless otherwise specified m the articles. Once duly
organized the shareholders can continue to transact business until
adjournment, notwithstanding that less than a quorum may be
thereafter present. Further, m case the meeting is called for the
election of directors and a quorum is not present, they may adjourn
from day to day under Section 27, Subdivision 3, and at the second
of such adjourned meetings, may elect directors even though a
quorum is not present.
It may be observed that when a meeting is duly organized a
majority of the votes present is sufficient to transact business, in
fact, a majority of the votes actually cast will decide when all do
not vote.88 It should be noted that while it is quite customary to
provide for a quorum in the by-laws, this section prohibits this
practice, except of course the by-laws follow the section. The only
exception to the provisions in Subdivision 2 is by control exercised
by the shareholders to be expressed in the articles of incorporation.
Under (c) of this subdivision, it may be questioned whether any
adjournment should be necessary, and anyway enough grace would
seem to be given by providing for an election at the first adjourned
meeting. If the election is vital, a quorum will be present. On
the whole this subdivision should accelerate the settlement of controversies over management.
SEcTioN 31 deals generally with the qualifications, election,
',Generally on voting trusts see Wormser, "The Legality of Corporate

Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements." 18 Col. L. Rev. 123 (1918)
Smith, "Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts," 22 Col. L. Rev. 627
(1922) Finkelstein, "Voting Trust Agreements," 24 Mich. L. Rev. 344
(1926).
Ballantine, Corporations (1st ed.) 1927, sec. 169.
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tenure, and meetings of the board of directors. Subdivision 1 provides that the business of the corporation shall be managed by a
board of at least three directors who need not be shareholders unless
the articles so require. Further it is expressly stipulated that a
director shall hold office until the expiration of the term for which
he was named and until his successor shall have been elected and
qualified. The prior statute provided for a board of "not less than
two trustees, who shall be stockholders. "7 Changes therefore to be
noted are a minimum of three directors instead of two and that they
need not be shareholders. 88 Further qualifications will be reserved
for discussion under Subdivision 3.
The former statute provided that the acts of the trustees were
valid and binding until their successors were elected and qualified.8 9 Under that statute it was held that the trustees of a corporation did not hold over as a matter of law 90 Under the foregoing subdivision it is expressly provided that they hold over. Further under the subdivision as it is provided that a "director shall
hold office for the term," it would seem by implication that he
must be appointed or elected for a term and could not be removed
except, of course, for cause and subject to the provision of Subdivision 4.
Subdivision 2 as to names and terms of office effects a change
noted heretofore under Section 3. It is further provided that the
directors shall be elected by the shareholders.9 1 This is traditional
Subdivision 3 provides that subject to the provisions of this Act
that the number, qualifications, terms of office, manner of election, time and place of meeting, and the powers and duties of the
directors may be prescribed by the articles or by-laws. As the only
apparent limitation as to what may be prescribed by the articles
or by-laws are the provisious of the Act, a strict construction
would exclude similar provisions under prior statutes except so far
as included in the Act. A liberal construction on the other hand,
particularly in view of the generality of the provision in this subdivision, would not exclude former specific statutory provisions
unless necessarily inconsistent with the spirit and provisious of
this subdivision. It is submitted, therefore, that the provisions
"Wash. Rem. Rev Stats., 1933, sec. 3812.
"It was held in Ouden and Bergman Co. v. Conlan, 34 Wash. 216, 75
Pac. 798 (1904) that a trustee of a corporation by a sale of his stock spso
facto ceased to be a trustee.
"Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, see. 3813.
Barnard Manufacturing Co. 'v. Ralston Milling Co., 93 Wash. 111, 160
Pac. 309 (1916).
9 Qualified in case of vacancies by subdiv 3 (b)
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under the former statute 2 with respect to the qualifications as to
residence, citizenship, and oath of office are still in force. Subject to the articles or by-laws otherwise prescribed, the subdivision
provides (a) that the directors shall be elected for a term of one
year, (b) that vacancies shall be filled by the board until successors are elected by the shareholders, (c) that meetings may be
held in or without the state as the majority of directors may from
time to time appoint, (d) what shall constitute a quorum, and (e)
authority for the board to constitute an executive committee. Of
these provisions (a), (b) and (d) are in accord with the usual practice." With respect to (d) it should be noted that the votes of a
majority of the directors present is necessitated. 94 The provision
in (c) is m accord with the former statute 5 except that the place
of meeting may be fixed as the majority of the directors may from
time to time appoint, whereas formerly the place must be designated in the articles or by-laws.96
The last clause (e) permits the board of directors by resolution
passed by the majority of the whole board to designate two or
more of their number to constitute an executive committee who
to the extent provided in said resolution shall have and exercise the
authority of the board of directors in the management of the
business of the corporation. This is a new provision and of vital
significance. As a matter of business practice where there are
large boards of directors, or where the members reside in different
places or are not easily assembled, or where meetings are set at
periods of long intervals, it has become customary to appoint an
executive committee and the full board is little more than a ratifying body Courts are at variance as to the extent to which the
board of directors may so delegate authority to an executive committee. On the one hand it has been held that they may delegate
to an executive committee of their own number the power to do
OWash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3812. This section reads as follows: "The corporate powers of a corporation shall be exercised by a
board of not less than two trustees, who shall be stockholders in the company, and at least one of whom shall be a resident of the state of Washington, and a majority of them citizens of the United States, who shall,
before entering upon the duties of their office, respectively take and subscribe to an oath, as provided by the laws of this state."
It may be suggested that this provision for residence and citizenship
Is better adapted for effecting the purpose intended than a similar provision in sec. 2 of the Act fixing the qualifications of ,the incorporators.
"SWash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3814, is almost identical with (d).
11This should be taken in consideration in case of an interested director. See Parsons v. Tacoma gmelting and Reylnzng Co., 25 Wash. 492, 65
Pac. 765 (1901).
03Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, see. 3816.
'The provisions in Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3816, requiring
copies of proceedings to -be filed at the principal office, is provided for in
see. 35, subdiv. 1 (a) of this Act.
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any act which they themselves might do ;917on the other hand it has
been held that the directors cannot confer power to discharge
duties which are of discretionary character except in the transaction of ordinary business of the corporation, unless authorized so
to do by charter.9 8 In view of Subdivision I of this Section, it
would seem that the directors cannot under (e) delegate the entire
supervision and control of the corporation to an executive committee as Subdivision 1 is controlling in requiring that the business of
every corporation shall be managed by the board. It should be
noted, however, that the provision under (e) permits the executive
committee to exercise the authority of the board of directors on
the management of the business of the corporation and accordingly
the acts of the executive committee will be binding upon the corporation as far as so exercised. This will raise the question of the
standard of care and skill to be exercised by the two groups. 99
The laws of other jurisdictions contain provisions that the executive committee "shall act only in the interval between the meetings of the board, and shall be subject at all times to the control
and direction of the board. "100 While such a provision would possibly be implied under (e) its specific inclusion will notify the
directors that they cannot delegate their entire powers and duties
to the executive committee.
Subdivision 4 provides that any director may be removed by twothirds of the voting power and at the special meeting called for this
purpose the shareholders may fill the vacancy created by this removal. This follows substantially the former law of this state
except that it is more accurately expressed. 10' This would seem to
defeat the purpose of Section 28, Subdivision 3, providing for
cumulative voting except in those cases where the minority represents more than one-third of the voting power. In a number of
jurisdictions where it is provided that a director may be removed
from office by a majority of the voting power it is further provided that unless the entire board be removed, no individual director shall be removed in case the votes of a sufficient number of
shares are cast against his removal which if then cumulatively
voted at an election of a full board would be sufficient to elect
"Hoyt Thonpson, Executors, 19 N. Y. 207 (1859).
Temple v. Dodge, 86 Tex. 69, 32 S. W 514, 33 S. W 222 (1895) the
by-laws gave the committee all the powers of the board of directors; see
also Young v. Schenck, 64 Wash. 90, 116 Pac. 588 (1911)
" See sec. 33, ufra.
" California General Corporation Law, sec. 308; Cal. Civ. Code (1931),
sec. 308; Ohio Gen. Code (Page 1931), sec. 8623-60; Minn. Laws of 1933,
Chap. 300, sec. 27 (h)
10'Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3812. In construing this statute
the court held in State ex Rel. Mitchell v. Horan, 22 Wash. 197, 60 Pac. 135
(1900) that two-thirds of the stockholders must be construed as twothirds of the stock.
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him. 0 2 A similar provision should be included in the Washington
Act. The general policy expressed in the subdivision is contrary
to the common law'0 3 and to that of most jurisdictions. Its apparent purpose is to make the board of directors either more or completely responsive to the will of the voting power designated. As
the desirability of such policy may vary with the nature of the
corporation, perhaps its determination should have been left to
the articles.
SECTION 32 provides for the election or appointment of officers
and agents, their authority and their removal. Primarily the
power to elect directors and other officers is in the stockholders,
but customarily the power is conferred upon the directors as to
other officers. Subdivision 1 specifically provides that the directors shall elect a president, a secretary and treasurer, and may
elect one or more vice-presidents. No one of said officers, except
the president, need be a director, but a vice-president who is not
a director cannot succeed to or fill the office of president. Any
two of the offices of vice-president, secretary and treasurer may
be held by one person. This subdivision will settle the somewhat
doubtful question as to whether the officers need be members of
the board of directors and in view of the preceding section whether
they need even be shareholders. The prior statute was not definite. 104 Subdivisions 2 and 3 are merely declaratory of common
practice. Attention is called to the former statute, 0 5 apparently
not affected, which requires the corporation on or before the second Tuesday of January of each year to file with the county auditor a statement, sworn to by its president and attested by its secretary containing a list of all its officers and their respective titles
of office, names and addresses, and the term of office for which
they have been chosen.
Subdivision 4 makes a substantial change in the law It was
formerly provided 0 6 that the corporation had the power to appoint
such officers, agents, and servants as the business of the corporation should require, and had the further power to remove them at
will. A long line of decisions has held that this authorized the
removal of any employee notwithstanding a contract of employment for a definite period without incurring liability for the un1*2Cal. Civ. Code (1931), sec. 310 (1) Minn. Laws of 1933, Chap. 300,
sec. 28 II.
10 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of .the Law of Private Corporations, 1931, vol.
2, see. 352.
"' Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3809.
Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3817.
16Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats., 1933, sec. 3809.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
earned portion of the salary contracted for. 07 Subdivision 4 provides that any officer or agent may be removed by the board of
directors whenever in their judgment the best interest of the corporation will be served thereby, such removal, however, to be without prejudice to the contract rights of the person so removed. This
will put the law in Washington in line with other jurisdictions
and seems desirable, as there is no justifiable reason for distinguishing employment contracts of corporations from those of individuals
or other business organizations.
The question is accordingly raised as to the effect of the Act
upon contracts existing at the time the Act went into effect. While
the Act itself will not make existing contracts enforceable it is
probable that in many instances subsequent acts by the parties m
recognition of the contract will be construed to give it effect either
through the principles of adoption or ratification.
SECTION 33 imposes a fiduciary relation upon the directors and
officers of the corporation. It fixes the standard of care as that
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. Some courts have held directors to
the care which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise m his
own business. The latter test in cases of boards of directors with
executive committees as well as other cases where directors merely
supervise would keep men of financial ability from assuming such
positions. 08 There was no similar prior statute in the state of
Washington.*
LESLIE J AYER."

107Among

these see Murray v. MacDougall & Southwick Co., 88 Wash.

358, 153 Pac. 317 (1915)

Williams v. Great Northern Railway Co., 108

Wash. 344, 184 Pac. 340 (1919)

and O'Donnell v. Sipprell, 163 Wash. 369,

1 Pac. (2d) 322 (1931).
'1 Hoshour, "Minnesota Business Corporation Act," 18 Minn. L. Rev. 7

(c)(1933).
* To be continued.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington.

